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COMMENT
MILLER V. ALBRIGHT. CONTINUING TO DISCRIMINATE ON
THE BASIS OF GENDER AND ILLEGITIMACY
INTRODUCTION

Today, with over three million U.S. citizens living and travelling
abroad,' many children are born in foreign countries to unwed parents.2
Should it be more difficult for a child born out of wedlock to receive
U.S. citizenship than it is for a child born to married parents? Should it
matter that the child's mother, rather than the child's father, is an American citizen? Contrary to the general antidiscrimination attitude prevalent
in today's society,' the answer to both of these questions is "yes, it does
matter." The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows either a
legitimate or an illegitimate child whose mother is a U.S. citizen to
automatically gain citizenship at birth.! Another section of the Act, however, provides that an illegitimate child born to a U.S. citizen father cannot become a citizen unless the father establishes paternity and supports
the child while the child is a minor.!
In Miller v. Albright,' a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the
provision of the INA limiting the citizenship of an illegitimate child born
to a U.S. citizen father does not violate equal protection.' This Comment
reviews the history of the law surrounding Miller, describes the case, and
argues that the plurality incorrectly upheld the Act by applying too narrow a level of scrutiny and by failing to sufficiently justify the INA's
gender classification. Moreover, the Court ignored recent cases forbidding discrimination based on gender or against illegitimate children. By
focusing on the distinction that the INA draws between mothers and fathers, the plurality overlooked the discriminatory effects of the Act on
illegitimate children.
!. See Millerv. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428,1462 (1998).
2. See Raymond C. O'Brien, Illegitimacy: Suggestion for Reform Following Mills v. Habluetzel, 15 ST. MARY'S LJ. 79, 110 (1983).
3. Cf. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31 CoLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 319,319 (1993) (outlining the strides made towards ending discrimination).
4. Cf. Howard F. Chang, Immigration Policy, LiberalPrinciples,and the Republican Tradition, 85 GEO. L.J. 2105, 2107 (1997) (recognizing that the INA "continues to discriminate on the
basis of both sex and illegitimacy").
5. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994).
6. Id. § 309,8 U.S.C. § 1409, see also infra text accompanying note 83.
7. 118 S. CL 1428 (1998).
8. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1428. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, delivered
the opinion; Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas concurred in the judgment; and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Souter dissented. For a discussion of these positions, see infra Part II.B.
9. See id. at 1434-35 (distinguishing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), and refusing to
consider that opinion's treatment of gender-based distinctions).
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Part I of this Comment explains the level of scrutiny applied in
equal protection cases and the relevant cases in which courts have addressed statutes that discriminate according to illegitimacy and gender. It
also reviews the history and current status of U.S. immigration and nationality law. Part II summarizes the plurality opinion, and each of the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Miller. Part III critiques the plurality decision and describes how the Act discriminates against illegitimate children.
I.BACKGROUND

A. Equal Protection
Although no explicit constitutional provision requires the federal
government to provide equal protection of the law, the Supreme Court
has extended the equal protection component of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' Thus, in Fifth
Amendment claims dealing with federal statutes based on gender or illegitimacy, courts must assess whether the governmental purpose justifies
the gender distinction at issue."
1. Level of Scrutiny
Depending on the circumstances of the case, a court applies one of
three types of equal protection review.'2 At a minimum, the statute must
be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. When classifications affect fundamental rights or disadvantage a class of people who
have historically been the victims of discrimination, courts apply strict
scrutiny, the highest level of review, requiring the government to demon-

10. In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: "No person shall
be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law." U.S. CONST. amend. V;
see HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGmMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 102 (1971); MARTHA T. ZINGO &
KEVIN E. EARLY, NAMELESS PERSONS: LEGAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NON-MARITAL
CHILDREN INTHE UNITED STATES 41 (1994). See generally Michael Gunlicks, Note, Citizenship As

a Weapon in Controlling the Flow of Undocumented Aliens: Evaluation of Proposed Denials of
Citizenship to Childrenof Undocumented Aliens Born in the United States, 63 GEO. wASH. L REV.
551,559 (1995) (describing the standards of review applied in equal protection cases).
11. See Jennifer Anne Schimpf, Comment, Gender-BasedStatute Conferring CitizenshipHeld
Unconstitutional:Wauchope v. United States Dep't of State, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 381,
381 (1995).

12. See Shanon M. Gregor, Comment, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-GenderDiscrimination: The Virginia Military Insitute Is Given the Opportunity to Create "Citizen Soldiers"
Out of Qualified Women-United States v. Virginia, 73 N.D. L. REV. 323, 328 (1997); John Galotto,
Note, StrictScrutinyfor Gender,Via Croson, 93 COLUM. L.REV. 508, 509 (1993).
13. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,792-96 (1977); Wauchope v. United States Dep't of

State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1993). See generally Schimpf, supranote 11, at 383-84 (stating
that the government only needs a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for the statute to be con-

stitutional).
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strate a regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. 4
Intermediate scrutiny is a heightened standard, requiring that the classification be "substantially related to important governmental objectives,"
and thus provides more protection than rational basis review but less
protection than strict scrutiny.'
During the past thirty years, the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled
to formulate an appropriate standard of review for statutes that classify
on the basis of gender or on the basis of illegitimacy."
2. Supreme Court Cases Concerning Gender-Based Discrimination
In Reed v. Reed,'7 decided in 1971, the Court recognized that equal
protection prohibits mandatory preference to members of either sex and
held (applying heightened scrutiny) that a statute giving preference to
male estate administrators over female estate administrators was unconstitutional." Two years later, in Fronderov. Richardson," the Court was
presented with a challenge to a statute giving dependents of male members of the armed forces greater access to benefits than dependents of
female members." The Court determined that sex is a suspect classification, warranting strict scrutiny, and held that the statute was unconstitutional based on equal protection principles.2'
The Supreme Court, however, has not consistently followed Frontiero in cases that involve gender discrimination-applying the intermediate standard rather than strict scrutiny.' In 1976, the Court in Craig
v. Boren,' formally adopted intermediate scrutiny as the standard of re14. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973) (using a strict scrutiny
standard for gender-based classifications); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 672
(1966) (applying strict scrutiny in a case involving a statute that classified persons according to
race). See generally Gaotto, supra note 12, at 537-38 (noting that "strict scrutiny is necessary to
'smoke out' racial classifications that are based on 'illegitimate notions of racial inferiority' or
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype" (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469,492 (1989))).
15. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 & n.9 (1982); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76
(1972). See generally Galotto, supra note 12, at 537-38 (observing that courts apply heightened
scrutiny in gender cases because of concerns about paternalism).
16. See David B. Howlett, Illegitimate Childrenand Military Benefits, 132 MIL. L REv. 5, 717 (1991) (explaining that the level of scrutiny applied in determining whether a statute is constitutional is crucial and identifying the results of lead cases); Collin O'Connor Udell. Note, Signaling a
New Direction in Gender ClassificationScrutiny: United States v. Virginia, 29 CONN. L. REV. 521,
529-32 (1996) (describing the level of review applied in gender discrmination cases).
17. 404U.S.71 (1971).
18. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76-77.
19. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
20. Frontiero,411 U.S. at 678.
21. Id. at 688. Frontierois the only case to date in which the Supreme Court has applied strict
scrutiny to a gender-based statute. See Udell, supra note 16, at 527.
22. See Galotto, supra note 12, at 522.
23. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
24. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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view for gender discrimination.' In this case, male plaintiffs between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-one sought injunctive relief against the enforcement of a statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of twenty-one and women under the age of eighteen.' Recognizing that "previous cases establish that classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives,' the Court determined that
stereotypes and generalizations characterizing men and women were an
insufficient justification for statutes distinguishing based on gender.'
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,' a 1982 case, the

Court was faced with a challenge by a male who wanted to pursue an
education at an exclusively female nursing school." In order to ensure
that the validity of a classification was not improperly determined according to "traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper
roles of men and women," ' the Court further heightened the intermediate
standard in gender-based cases by requiring the government to prove an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification?2 Accordingly, the Court determined that prohibiting males from enrolling in a
professional school violated equal protection!
In 1996, the Supreme Court, again requiring an exceedingly persuasive justification for the classification, determined that the benefits associated with single sex schools did not justify Virginia's exclusion of
women from the Virginia Military Institute.? By applying the heightened
standard of review, the Court has consistently refused to uphold statutes
containing gender-based classifications."
3. Supreme Court Cases Concerning Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children
The Supreme Court has considered the validity of various justifications for classifications based on illegitimacy in over twenty cases during

25.
26.
27.

Craig,429 U.S. at 197-98.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 197.

28. Id. at 198. Specifically, the Court refused to hear evidence (offered as a basis for upholding the statute) that young adult males were arrested for drunk driving more often than females. Id.
at 200-01.
29. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
30. Hogan, 458 U.S.at 727.
31. Id. at 725-26.
32. Id. at 723-24 & n.9.
33. Id. at 733.
34. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 516 (1996) (continuing to require an exceedingly
persuasive justification in the gender context).
35. See, e.g., id.; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 733; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,200(1976).
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the past thirty years. ' While the Court did not expressly hold-until 1988
Clark v. Jeter'-thata heightened level of scrutiny should apply to a law
that classified people according to illegitimacy. Several--but not allcases addressing illegitimacy beginning in the 1970s implicitly applied
heightened scrutiny.3
In 1968, the Supreme Court first addressed the question of whether
illegitimacy may be used as the basis for a legislative classification in
Levy v. Louisiana." In addressing the standard for reviewing a legislative
act, the court recognized that while "we give great latitude to the legislature in making classifications. ... we have been extremely sensitive
when it comes to basic civil rights and have not hesitated to strike down
an invidious classification even though it had history and tradition on its
side."' Finding that "[liegitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation
to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother,"' the Court
held that a wrongful death statute denying recovery to illegitimate children after their mother's death, but allowing legitimate children the right
to recover, violated the Equal Protection Clause. '2
Arguably, the Court did not consistently follow Levy's precedent. '
In 1977, the Supreme Court in Trimble v. Gordon,. addressed whether an
intestate succession law that allowed illegitimate children to inherit only
from their mothers violated the Equal Protection Clause.* Articulating a
standard of review similar to intermediate level scrutiny,. the court held

36. See ZINGO &EARLY, supra note 10, at 92-93 (discussing several cases in which the Court
has considered classifications based on birth status); Howlett, supra note 16, at 14 (describing the
Court's analytical method in cases involving illegitimacy classifications).
37. 486 U.S. 456,461 (1988).
38. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977) (applying a standard that asks whether
the statute is "carefully tuned to alternative considerations" to examine the constitutionality of statutes that distinguish between illegitimate and legitimate children); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972) (indicating that the level of scrutiny applied to legitimacy classifications
should be stricter because "fundamental personal rights" are involved).
39. 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
40. Levy, 391 U.S. at 71.
41. Id. at 72.
42. Id.
43. In 1968, the Court invalidated another statute that discriminated against children born out
of wedlock. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968). In 1971, however, the Court in Labine v. Vincent upheld a statute that denied intestate succession to an illegitimate daughter. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 539 (1971) (basing its decision on the strong state
interest in regulating the disposition of property at death). A year later, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., the Court struck down a workmen's compensation statute that favored legitimate
children over illegitimate children. 406 U.S. at 165, 175-76.
44. 430 U.S. 456 (1977).
45. Trimbk, 430 U.S. at 776.
46. Id. at 766-67. As stated by the Court
"Mhis Court requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose." In this context, the standard just stated is a
minimum; the Court sometimes requires more. "Though the latitude given state economic
and social regulation is necessarily broad, when state statutory classifications approach
sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a stricter scrutiny..."
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that the law unjustifiably discriminated against illegitimate children.'7 In
Fiallo v. Bell, also decided in 1977, the Court upheld a section of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act which gave preferential immigration
status to a child born out of wedlock to an American mother but not to a
.child born to an American father." The Court refused to apply the intermediate level of review and used the minimal review stindard because of
Congress's broad power over immigration and naturalization issues."
Moreover, the Court reasoned that illegitimate children should not receive preferential status because of a "perceived absence in most cases of
close family ties" ' and the difficulties involved in proving paternity.'
In contrast, in 1979, the Court found that an adoption law requiring
only the permission of a mother for the adoption of her illegitimate child
denied equal protection to fathers.- The Court determined that the law
failed to meet the heightened standard of scrutiny because the well being
of illegitimate children did not "serve important governmental objectives" and therefore did not justify the distinction between unwed mothers and fathers.' To further confuse the issue, the Court applied rational
basis scrutiny in Parham v. Hughes," also decided in 1979, and upheld a
wrongful death statute that discriminated against illegitimate children. '
Five years later, in Lehr v. Robertson,' the Court upheld a statute
that required an unwed father of an illegitimate child to take certain steps

... Despite the conclusion that classifications based on illegitimacy fall in a "realm
of less than strictest scrutiny," Lucas also establishes that the scrutiny "is not a toothless
one.,,
Id. at 766-67 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972) and
Mathews v. Lucas, 724 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)) (first and second alterations in original).
47. Id. at 773-74.
48. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
49. Fia//o, 430 U.S. at 791-92. The Court stated that Congress, not the courts, should make
decisions regarding immigration issues. Id. at 798.
50. Id. at 792-95. Specifically, the Court required the government to prove a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for the distinction. Id. at 794.
51. Id. at799.
52. Id.
53. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (analyzing a statute containing genderbased classifications). Like this Comment, Caban has been examined along with cases deciding
issues of discrimination based on illegitimacy because the Court discussed a state's interests in
illegitimate children and the differences between mothers and fathers of illegitimate children. See
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSITUIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 18.14(2ded. 1992).
54. Caban,441 U.S. at 388-91.
55. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
56. Parham, 441 U.S. at 348-49. The statute at issue allowed the mother of an illegitimate
child, or the father of a motherless legitimate child, to *suefor the wrongful death of that child but
precluded the father of an illegitimate child from bringing such an action. Id. In the concurring and
dissenting opinions, five Justices advocated for the application of the heightened standard of review
because the statute included a gender-based distinction. Id at 359, 362.
57. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
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in order to receive notice of adoption." The father claimed that his equal
protection rights were violated, not the rights of his child. Applying the
intermediate standard to the potential violation of the father's rights, the
Court recognized that laws "may not subject men and women to disparate treatment when there is no substantial relation between the disparity
and an important state purpose." The Court upheld the law to encourage
adoption and promote the state's "preference for the formal family."
In the late 1980s, the Court heard Clark v. Jeter, a case in which
the petitioner claimed that a Pennsylvania law requiring an illegitimate
child to prove paternity within six years of her birth in order to seek support from her father was unconstitutional.6 ' Because a legitimate child
does not face these time limitations to obtain support from her parents,
the statute contained an unjustified classification based on illegitimacy
which violated the Equal Protection Clause.' In its decision, the Court
formally adopted the intermediate level of scrutiny for classifications
based on illegitimacy to ensure that illegitimate children are not punished
for their parents' conduct.'
Viewed together, these decisions represent the confusion of the
rights the Supreme Court allotted to unwed fathers and their children
born out of wedlock."
B. History Surrounding the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Laws
Under common law, children born abroad could only gain American
citizenship if their father had resided in the United States.' Congress's
amendment of section 1993 of the Revised Statutes by the Act of May 24,
1934" ended the discrimination against mothers of children born abroad. 7

58. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68.
59. Id. at 258.
60. 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
61. Clark, 486 U.S. at 457.

62.

Id. at 462-65.

63. Id. at 461 (stating that discriminatory classifications based on illegitimacy deserve the
intermediate level of scrutiny, which requires that the statute "be substantially related to an important governmental objective").
64. See Howlett, supra note 16, at 14.
65. 7 CHARLES GORDON Fr AL., IMMIGRATiON LAW AND PROCEDURE § 93.04(2)(b) (1998).
66. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344,48 StaL. 797.
67. Id. § 1,48 Stat. at 797. Section 1993 was amended to read:
Any child hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose father or mother or both as the time of the birth of such child is a citizen of the United
States...; but the rights of citizenship shall not descend to any such child unless the citizen father or citizen mother... has resided in the United States previous to the birth of
such child. In cases where one of the parents is an alien, the right of citizenship shall not
descend unless the child comes to the United States and resides therein for at least five
years continuously immediately previous to his eighteenth birthday, and unless, within
six months after the child's twenty-first birthday, he or she shall take an oath of allegiance to the United States of America ....
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The Nationality Act of 1940r established different citizenship criteria for

children born out of wedlock.' 9 While a child could gain nationality from
an American mother at birth, an illegitimate child with an American father
would qualify for U.S. citizenship only if the father legitimized or received
the adjudication of paternity during the child's minority years."
Although the Constitution and its amendments provide no mention of
immigration' and do not define citizenship,' immigration law principles
are largely based upon the Equal Protection Clause:"In 1886, the Supreme
Court determined that the phrase "any person" in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause included aliens as well as citizens. '4 Congress, however, has the authority to classify aliens and may opt to treat
them less favorably than citizens.' Consequently, even though the Constitution protects individual rights of persons in the United States, Congress
may subject aliens living abroad to arbitrary classifications.'
Moreover, the plenary power doctrine provides "broad and often exclusive authority" to Congress and the Executive Branch in deciding
immigration and naturalization issues.' Because of judicial deference to
this power, courts have limited review or applied rational basis scrutiny
to cases involving immigration and nationality.' In Plyler v. Doe," the
Court indicated that cases in the immigration context may warrant an
intermediate level of scrutiny.' The protections in Plyler, however, have

Id.; see 7 GORDON Er AL., supra note 65, § 93.04(2)(b). At that time, Congress did not distinguish
between children born out of wedlock and children born in wedlock. See Miller v. Albright, 118 S.
CL 1428, 1452 (1998).
68. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876,54 Stat. 1137.
69. Id. § 205,54 Star. at 1139-40; see 7 GORDON ET AL., supra note 65, § 93.04(2)(b).
70. See Nationality Act of 1940 § 205, 54 Stat. at 1139-40; 7 GORDON Lr AL., supra note 65,
§ 93.04(2)(c). Section 205 stated: "The [citizenship provisions of this Act) hereof apply... to a
child bonm out of wedlock, provided the paternity is established during minority, by legitimation, or
adjudication of a competent court." Nationality Act of 1940 § 205, 54 Stat. at 1139. The Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, repealed the 1940 Act in favor of mom
comprehensive legislation, but did not make any significant changes to the law in this area. See 7
GORDON ET AL., supra note 65, § 93.04(2)(b).
71. Louis Henkin, The ConstitutionAs Compact and As Conscience: IndividualRights Abroad
and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. It, 12 (1985).
72. Id. at 13-14.
73. John T. Ritondo, California'sDuty to Educate the World: Proposition 187 and Mere
Rationality, 26 CuMB. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1996).
74. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,369(1886).
75. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889); see also Henkin, supra
note 71, at 16-17.
76. lHenkin, supra note 71, at 27.
77. Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of ConstitutionalImmigration Law,
94 M1CH. L. REv. 1927,1939 (1996).
78. See, e.g., iallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,795 (1977); Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 805 (9th
Cir. 1995); see also Chang, supranote 4, at 2107 (describing the level of scrutiny applied in Fiallo).
79. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
80. Plyler,457 U.S. at 217-18.
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been limited to cases where the people claiming citizenship have come to
the United States and developed ties with the country."'

Currently, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) allows an illegitimate child with a U.S.
citizen parent to become a citizen at birth if that parent lived in the
United States for at least five years." Section 1401(g), however, does not
confer citizenship upon children born out of wedlock unless the requirements in 8 U.S.C. § 1409 are satisfied." As amended in 1986, section
1409 requires a child born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen father to provide clear and convincing evidence of paternity and a statement confirming that the father will provide financial support until the child
reaches the age of eighteen."

II. MILLER V.ALBRIGHT
A. Facts and Procedural History
While serving in the U.S. Air Force and stationed in the Philippines,
Charlie Miller, an American citizen, met Luz Penero, a Filipino national,
and conceived Lorelyn Penero Miller.' Because Ms. Penero Miller was
born and raised by her mother in the Philippines, her father was unaware
of her existence until after her twenty-first birthday." In 1992, Mr. Miller
received a decree from a Texas court to establish his paternity." Assured
that Mr. Miller was her biological father, Ms. Penero Miller applied for
U.S. citizenship." The State Department denied her application because
the paternity decree did not fulfill the requirements of section 1409?'

81. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,271 (1990).
82. INA § 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994). Section 1401(g) provides that an individual born
outside of the United States with "parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the
United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its
outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than five years" is a citizen at birth. Id.
83. Id. § 309(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a). Children born abroad are U.S. citizens when one parent is
a U.S. citizen and the other is an alien if:
(1) [A] blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear and
convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the person's birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for the
person until the person reaches the age of 18 years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a competent court.
Id.
84. Id. It is interesting to note that a U.S. district court determined that the distinction made in
section 1409 on the basis of both sex and illegitimacy failed to meet even the minimum rationality
standard. LeBnm v. Thomburgh, 777 F. Supp. 1204, 1211 (D.NJ. 1991).
85. 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998).
86. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1432-33.
87. Id. Ms. Penero Miller was born in June 1970. Id. at 1432.
88. Id. at 1433.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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Specifically, Mr. Miller failed to legitimate and support Ms. Penero
Miller while she was a minor."
In 1993, Ms. Penero Miller and her father filed a complaint in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas to obtain a judgment
establishing that Ms. Penero Miller was a citizen of the United States. In
an amended complaint, Ms. Penero Miller alleged that the distinction in
section 1409 based on illegitimacy did not meet equal protection standards." The Texas district court transferred the case to the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, where venue was proper.'
The district court found that Ms. Penero Miller suffered an injury in fact
and established a causal connection between her injury and the statute
she claimed was unconstitutional." The court held, however, that because
federal courts do not have the power to grant citizenship, she failed to
show redressability and therefore lacked standing to sue.
On appeal, the court of appeals held that the district court improperly dismissed for lack of standing, but rejected her constitutional challenges to section 1409.' Finding the Supreme Court's decision in FWio
v. Bell dispositive," section 1409 did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause because the government's interests in protecting the child's ties to
the United States and to her citizen relatives presented a "legitimate and
bona fide reason" for the classification.' Judge Wald concurred in the
judgement because she believed the holding in Fiallowas binding, but she
also expressed concern that Fiallo was "out of step" with the Supreme
Court's current antipathy to classifications based on broad generalizations
regarding men and women.)" The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari' and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals."

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.
94.
95.

Miller v. Christopher, 870 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1994).
Miller, 118 S. CL at 1433.
Miller, 870 F. Supp. at 3.

96. Id.
97. Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1471-73 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding the statutory
distinction between illegitimate and legitimate children regarding the claims of several aliens seeking special immigration preference).
98. Miller, 96 F.3d at 1471 (noting that Fiallo v. Bell must be followed because that case
involved an equal protection challenge to an immigration statute that discriminated according to the
status of the child and the sex of the parent); see also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
99. Miller, 96 F.3d at 1470, 1472.
100. Id. at 1473, 1475-77 (Wald, J., concurring).
101. Miller v. Albright, 117 S. CL 1551 (1997) (granting certiorari). Certiorari was later limited
to the question of whether the distinction in section 1409 between illegitimate children of U.S.
citizen mothers and illegitimate children of U.S. citizen fathers violates the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. Miller v. Albright, 117 S. Ct 1689 (1997).
102. Miller v. Albright, 118 S. CL 1428, 1442 (1998). Justice Stevens announced the judgment
of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at
1432. Justice O'Connor delivered a concurring opinion in which Justice Kennedy joined. Id. at 1442
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B. Supreme Court Opinion
1. Plurality Opinion
The U.S. Supreme Court explained that the issue in Miller v. Albright turned on whether the distinction in section 1409 between illegitimate children of U.S. citizen mothers and illegitimate children of U.S.
citizen fathers violated the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution."n
Ms. Penero Miller alleged that the INA's discriminatory treatment of
citizen fathers violated the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment.'" The government argued that the law was designed to ensure that the child develops ties to the United States and that the father
acknowledges and financially supports the child.'" Before discussing this
issue on its merits, Justice Stevens, the author of the plurality opinion,
disposed of a few initial points. First, the plurality decided that Fiallo v.
Bell was not controlling in Miller."° Fiallo involved a claim for immigration status of aliens, not citizenship, and there the Court considered
the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children.
Miller, on the other hand, addressed the disparate treatment of mothers
and fathers of illegitimate children." The Court also determined that Ms.
Penero Miller had standing to bring this claim because she was contesting the government's refusal to treat her as a citizen and because her
claim was based on discrimination against both herself and her father."
The plurality held that section 1409 did not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, accepting the justification for
the classification made by Congress.'" Justice Stevens applauded section
1409(c), which automatically confers citizenship on the child of an
American mother, because it "rewards" a mother's decision to carry the
child to term."' In contrast, Justice Stevens noted that because an American father is not necessarily aware of the child' and is not burdened with
the obligation to care for the child, he should not be similarly rewarded."2
Justice Stevens explained that for this reason the father should be re(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia delivered a separate concurring opinion in which Justice
Thomas joined. Id. at 1446 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg delivered a dissenting opinion
in which Justices Souter and Breyer joined. Id. at 1449 (Ginsburg, J.,dissenting). Justice Breyer
delivered a separate dissenting opinion in which Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined. Id. at 1455
(Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
103. Id. at 1434.
104. Id. at 1432.
105. Respondents' Brief at 28-30, Miller v. Albright, 18 S. CL 1428 (1998) (No. 96-1060).
106. Miller, 118S. Ct. at 1434-35.

107.

Id.

108. Id. at 1436. Justice Stevens noted: "It is of significance that the petitioner in this case... is
not challenging the denial of an application for special status." Id.
109. Id. at 1432.
110. Id. at 1437 (stating that because mothers "must first choose to carry the pregnancy to term
and reject the alternative of abortion ....Section 1409(c) rewards that choice.").
11. Id. at 1430.
112. Id. at 1437.
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quired to comply with section 1409(a) by3 acknowledging his paternity
under oath while the child is still a minor."
The plurality believed that sufficient government's interests validated section 1409.2" First, the Court noted that the government desire to
ensure that the child has a blood relationship with an American citizen
and to deter fraudulent claims of citizenship justified the additional requirements imposed on unwed fathers."" Second, Justice Stevens argued
that if the statute established gender-neutral criteria, such as requiring the
citizen parent to obtain proof within thirty days, it would have the practical effect of discriminating against the unwed father."' Pursuant to this
theory, a statute allowing a father a period of eighteen years to establish
paternity should be not be viewed as discriminatory.' 7 Third, the court
held that despite the reliability of genetic testing and the requirement of
proof of paternity by clear and convincing evidence set forth in section
1409(a)(1)," ' Congress was justified in requiring additional proof of paternity." 9 Fourth, Justice Stevens suggested that the statute was upheld
because it promotes the government's interest in establishing relationships between citizen parents and their children and between the children
and the United States."2 Finally, the plurality advocated that because
Congress was concerned that a large number of American military servicemen who were stationed abroad may have fathered children, section
1409 guarantees that children who may not know or are not known by
their fathers do not automatically receive citizenship.'
The plurality rejected the plaintiff's argument that the statute is the
product of "overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and
women."'" Instead, Justice Stevens argued that the assumption that fathers are less likely than mothers to develop a relationship with their
children, an assumption on which section 1409 relies, is based on bio-

113.

Id.

114. Miller, 118 S.CL at 1437-40.
115. Id. at 1437.
116. Id. at 1438.
117. Id. at 1438-39.
118. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
119. Miller, 118 S. C. at 1438-39. Specifically, section 1409(a) requires that while under the
age of eighteen, the person must be legitimated by law, the father must acknowledge paternity in

writing under oath, or the person must establish paternity by adjudication. INA § 309(a), 8 U.S.C. §
1409(a) (1994).
120. Miller, 118 S. CL at 1439. Because an unmarried father may not know that his child exists,
it seems reasonable that he take the steps required to acknowledge his child. Id. at 1439 n.It.
Moreover, because a mother usually has custody at the child's birth, it is more likely that a child will
establish ties to the United States. id.
121. Id. at 1439.
122. Id. (quoting Petitioners' Brief at 8, Miller v. Albright, 118 S.CL 1428 (1998) (No. 961060)). The plurality noted that a narrow standard of review should apply because the case deals
with the area of immigration and naturalization. Id. Even under heightened scrutiny, section
1409(aX4) "is substantially related to important governmental objectives." Id.
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logical differences between the sexes and is thus a justified basis for
classification.'" Furthermore, requiring fathers, and not mothers, to make
an "affirmative act" in order to gain rights associated with their children
followed the precedent established by the Supreme Court in Lehr v.
Robinson.'2 Finally, the plurality distinguished Miller from recent gender-equality cases," noting that Ms. Penero Miller's citizenship request
rested on several
26 factors, including her parents' conduct, and not merely
on her gender.'
2. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor based her concurring opinion on the premise that
federal courts should not determine the rights of third parties who are not
parties to the litigation.'" The Justice believed that Mr. Miller had not
been substantially hindered in his ability to assert his own rights."l Mr.
Miller had the opportunity to take advantage of the appeals process but
did not assert his rights." Therefore, Ms. Penero Miller could not assert
her father's rights and instead must raise her own rights, which would
likely be unsuccessful because section 1409 does not classify people
according to the gender of the child.'" Although Justice O'Connor supported the dismissal of the claim, she advocated the application of rational basis scrutiny because the statute involves the area of immigration
and nationalization.'3 ' She also explained that even though the classification would be upheld under a rational basis standard of review, it would
not withstand heightened scrutiny.'"
3. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
According to Justice Scalia, Ms. Penero Miller's claim was correctly dismissed because the Court had no power to confer citizenship on
a basis other than that established by Congress.'33 Because Ms. Penero
Miller did not qualify for citizenship based on section 1409, the Court
had no discretion to decide the case on its merits." Moreover, he ex123. Id. at 1442.
124. Id. at 1440. In Lehr v. Robinson, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a statute requiring an
unwed father, and not a mother, to prove his paternity by some formal act in order to receive notice
prior to the adoption of his children did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Lehr v. Robinson,
463 U.S. 248, 248-50 (1983).
125. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1441 (distinguishing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996);
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1442 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 1443-44.
129. Id. at 1444.
130. Id. at 1445.
131. Id. at 1446.
132. Id. at 1445-46.
133. Id. at 1446 (Scalia, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 1447.
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plained that Congress has significant authority in the area of immigration
and nationalization and courts have limited discretion. Justice Scalia
also emphasized that a court cannot "fix" the law by holding certain provisions unconstitutional.
4. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg believed that the Court should have followed earlier cases which rejected statutes that classified based on gender stereotypes where more accurate and impartial distinctions could have been
made." The Justice recognized that American women have been discriminated against throughout history in the areas of immigration and
nationalization." When the legislature amended section 1409 in 1986, it
continued to discriminate on the basis of gender. 3 According to Justice
Ginsburg, the government's rationale was based on generalizations concerning the abilities of men and women.'" She concluded that because
the government could promote the interest of assuring close ties to the
United States without classifying based on gender,' section 1409 violated the Equal Protection Clause.' 2
5. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer believed that the Court should have applied heightened scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the provisions in section 1409.'" Although the area of immigration and nationalization is traditionally subject to a more lenient standard of review, Justice Breyer felt
that Ms. Penero Miller belonged to a class whose rights had been determined based on the gender of their parents.'" When the Act is reviewed
under heightened scrutiny, the standard typically applied in gender discrimination cases, Justice Breyer felt that it could not survive constitutional analysis.'

135. Id. (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S 787,792 (1977)).
136. Id. at 1449. Accoiding to Justice Scalia, "fixing" the law would require the Court to perform "radical statutory surgery," and disregarl "one provision or the other as unconstitutional." Id.
137. Id. at 1449-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1450-53. Until 1934, a woman could not confer her U.S. citizenship on her children
born abroad. Id. at 1451-52; see supra notes 65-67.
139. Id. at 1453.
140. Id. at 1454.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1449-50.
143. Id. at 1457 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Initially, Justice Breyer mentioned that Ms. Penero
Miller may assert her father's rights because she has suffered an injury in fact, she had a close relationship with her father, and her father faced some hindrance in asserting his rights. Id. at 1456.
144. Id. at 1457.
145. Id. at 1460.
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Justice Breyer argued that the plurality inadequately justified the
gender classifications" and that the government failed to prove an "exceedingly persuasive justification,"'" for the distinction in section 1409
between men and women." Moreover, Justice Breyer contended that the
statutory distinction depends on the generalization that mothers are more
likely to care for their children and are better caretakers than fathers.49
The Justice also observed that the additional legitimation or acknowledgement requirement is unnecessary to protect against false claims
because advanced DNA tests prove paternity with certainty.'" In addition, although Justice Stevens assumed in the plurality opinion that once
a father knows of his child he will establish a relationship with his child
and his child will therefore have ties to the United States, Justice Breyer
argued that these bonds will not necessarily be formed."! Justice Breyer
further indicated that section 1409 refers to all the American citizens
who live or travel abroad, not merely the 683,000 service personnel stationed in the Far East mentioned in Justice Stevens' opinion.:' Finally,
Justice Breyer's dissent suggested that Congress could substitute a gender-neutral requirement for the current provision."u

III. ANALYSIS
In Miller v. Albright, the Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1409
did not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment
even though the statute classifies on the basis of gender and
illegitimacy.'" Five justices, however, agreed that the purported governmental interests did not justify the distinction." This analysis argues that
the plurality applied an inappropriate level of scrutiny and overlooked
several controlling precedents. Moreover, the analysis further discusses
the plurality's failure to consider the discriminatory effects that the
Miller decision will have on illegitimate children.

146. Id. at 1455.
147. This language indicates the heightened scrutiny standard. See id.
148. Id. at 1460 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996)).
149. Id. at 1461.
150. Id. at 1461-62.
151. Id. at 1462.
152. Id.
153. Id. Justice Breyer'noted that requiring knowledge of the child's birth or distinguishing
between caretaker and noncaretaker parents could substitute for the gender-based classification. Id.
Justice Breyer also disagreed with Justice Scalia's opinion that the Court does not have the power to
grant citizenship. Id. at 1463. He explained that limitations on the Court's power to grant citizenship
are irrelevant because section 1401 confers citizenship at birth. Id.
154. Id. at 1432.
155. See id. at 1445 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1455 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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A. The PluralityApplies the IncorrectLevel of Scrutiny
Although the level of scrutiny applied in equal protection cases is
critical and often determines the outcome of a case,'" the plurality did not
initially specify the standard of review it was applying in Miller. Rather,
the Court briefly mentioned in a footnote that because deference should
be given to Congress in the area of immigration and nationality, Miller
warranted a narrower, rational basis standard of review." The plurality's
reasoning became further blurred when it indicated that even if the intermediate level of scrutiny was applied, section 1409 sufficiently relates
to important governmental interests and would survive such scrutiny."
Justice Stevens, however, failed to elaborate on the heightened scrutiny
standard's imposition on the government to establish an exceedingly
persuasive justification for the gender-based classification. ' " According
to this reasoning, it is unlikely that he adequately applied an appropriate
level of scrutiny given recent Supreme Court precedent."w Because of the
ambiguity of the plurality opinion, it is difficult to determine which level
of scrutiny was actually applied in Miller. Moreover, the plurality's failure to hold that section 1409 violates equal protection indicates that the
plurality applied the minimum level of scrutiny."'
Recent Supreme Court cases clearly state that the heightened scrutiny standard applies without exception to all "gender based government
actions.'" Because the Court has expressly determined that the distinction between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers constitutes a gender-based classification, heightened scrutiny was required in Miller. In
addition, statutes classifying on the basis of illegitimacy have also war-

156. Cf., e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S 347, 351-52 (1979) (applying rational basis scrutiny
and upholding a statute that classified individuals by sex). See generally Howlett, supra note 16, at
17 (describing the importance of the level of scrutiny used in cases involving discrimination against
illegitimate children); Galotto, supra note 12,at 509 (indicating that the level of scrutiny applied to
gender-based discrimination cases often serves as an explanation for the outcome).
157. Miller, 118S.Ct. at1437n.ll.
158. Id.
159. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,723-24 (1982).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996) (reiterating that the
government must demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification for gender-based classifications); Hogan,458 U.S. at 724 (indicating that the burden of proof is demanding and rests entirely
on the state).
161. On the other hand, both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, in their dissenting opinions,
observed that the provisions of section 1409 must be subject to heightened scrutiny. Miller, 118 S.
Ct. at 1450, 1454, 1457-60.
162. See discussion supra Part LA.2; see also Galotto, supra note 12, at 508. See generally
Amicus Brief at 17, Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998) (No. 96-1060) (stating that Congress's specialized judgments concerning the security matters at issue must be accompanied by
evidence and meet the heightened scrutiny standard if they discriminate on the basis of gender).
Moreover, the standard of review remains high when the statutory policy discriminates against
males rather than against females. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723.
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ranted the intermediate level of review. ' 6 Therefore, because section
1409 distinguishes between illegitimate children and legitimate
children,'" the Court should have considered Miller under a heightened
level of review.''
Although courts have tended to limit the scope of review in the area
of immigration and naturalization,'" adherence to rational basis scrutiny
is outdated."7 Critics have advocated that the Constitution does not require courts to recognize Congress's plenary power'" and that immigration law must adhere to modem constitutional boundaries.'" Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that deference to Congress does not
trump the heightened scrutiny standards of the Equal Protection Clause."
In addition, courts have expressly differentiated between the rights
afforded to citizens versus those granted to aliens.'' Similarly, the plurality in Miller initially distinguished Miller from Fiallo v. Bell' because
Miller addressed the rights of an American citizen, while Fiallo involved
the immigration of aliens.'" The Supreme Court has held that the test for
citizenship should hinge on the individual's ties to the United States.' 7'
Ms. Penero Miller's close connections to the country included the fact
that she was a child of an American citizen and she maintained a con-

163. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (stating that courts should apply the heightened level scrutiny to all illegitimacy cases); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76
(1972) (noting that the heightened level of scrutiny should be applied because fundamental rights are
concerned). See generally ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 53, § 18.14 (discussing legitimacy
classifications and the Supreme Court's use of such classifications).
164. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at1434.
165. Justice O'Connor argued that the Court should apply rational basis scrutiny because the
distinction is not based on the child's gender. Id at 1445 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Her argument,
however, seems unpersuasive because the main issue in Miller focused on the gender classification
of mothers versus fathers. Cf. id. at 1434.
166. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82
(1976).
167. Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1474 n.2 (Wald, J., concurring). Current Supreme
Court doctrine indicates that a standard must account for Congress's power over immigration as well
as the constitutional rights of citizens. Id.
168. See Peter H. Schuck, The Re-Evaluation ofAmerican Citizenship, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 1,
22-23 (1997).
169. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, FederalRegulationofAliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 862, 870-71 (1989); Legomsky, supra note 3, at 319-20.
170. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (referring to Congress's deference to
executive authority over national defense and military affairs). Even if the standard of review is
limited, the Court must ensure that the rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment have not been
violated. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (holding that the denial of public education to
undocumented alien children violated the Equal Protection Clause).
171. See, e.g., Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 804-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763,769-71 (1950).
172. Millerv. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428,1447(1998).
173. Fia//o, 430 U.S. at 796.
174. See, e.g., Landon v. Pasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
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tinuing relationship with her American father.'" Because Ms. Penero
Miller had a legitimate claim for citizenship, the Court was not obligated
to extend the same amount of deference usually given to Congress in the
area of immigration."6
Moreover, courts must apply a stricter standard of review to cases
involving fundamental rights or suspect classes.' Because the Supreme
Court has described U.S. citizenship as "a most precious right"' and
described noncitizens as a discrete minority,'' the Court may be required
to apply a stricter standard of review." ° If the plurality reviewed section
1409 under the stricter equal protection standard, the Court would have
likely held the provisions requiring an unwed father, and not a mother, to
take affirmative steps to transfer citizenship unconstitutional because it
violates the Equal Protection Clause."'
B. Section 1409 Relies on Suspect and Untrue Stereotypes
Even under rational basis scrutiny, the interests that the government
seeks to protect do not serve as sufficient justification for section 1409.2"
The plurality sought to justify the gender classification in section 1409
with the government's interest in ensuring proof of paternity and deterring
fraud." While requiring legitimization may have been reasonable before
the advances in genetic testing, it is no longer necessary because Congress
itself has acknowledged the reliability of current paternity tests.'"
The justification for statutory distinctions based on gender must be
genuine and cannot rely on "overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females."'" Section
175. See Amicus Brief at 15, Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998) (No. 96-1060) (brief in
support of petitioner).
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (stating that inherently suspect classifications must be subjected to close judicial scrutiny); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,

406 U.S. 164,173 (1972).
178. Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1547 (1998) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 159 (1963)).
179. See Michael Scaperlanda, PartialMembership:Aliens and the ConstitutionalCommunity,
81 IowA L REv. 707,707 (1996).
180. See Gunlicks, supra note 10, at 560-61, 575; see also Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 682 (stating
that close judicial scrutiny is warranted where fundamental ights ae concerned).
181. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1455 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 1445-46 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1473-74 (Wald, J., concurring); see also Howlett,
supra note 16, at 17 (noting that the level of scrutiny applied by a court often determines the outcome).
182. "It is unlikely... that any gender classifications based on stereotypes can survive heightened scrutiny ....
Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1445-46 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
183. See id. at 1437-38.
184. Miller, 96 F.3d at 1474-75 (Wald, J., concurring) (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-527, at 38

(1983)).
185. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975) (noting that states "must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the
different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females").
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1409 relies upon the generalization that mothers are significantly more
likely than fathers to assume child care obligations or develop relationships with their children." Even if unwed mothers were closer to their
children than unwed fathers, this generalization is an unacceptable basis
for legislative distinctions."
Justice Stevens's reasoning in Miller further supports his critics'
views that he will neglect historical sex role stereotyping underlying a
challenged statute and uphold gender-based discrimination if based on
reasoned distinctions."' Justice Stevens argued that section 1409 rewards
mothers for "reject[ing] the alternative of abortion" and caring for the
child after birth."' Not only does he inappropriately apply his pro-life
views and preference toward marriage and the traditional nuclear family,
but his argument fails to acknowledge the constitutional rights of the
father." Illegitimate children should not be burdened in order to encourage legitimate family relationships."' The plurality's alternative rationales are wholly unrelated to the interests of promoting an illegitimate
child's ties to the United States and that child's citizen parent.
Moreover, because the governmental interests of promoting ties to
the United States and the citizen parent could be protected with a genderneutral classification, the additional requirements for unwed fathers are
unnecessary." The plurality rejected this idea after considering only one
such criterion. According to Justice Stevens, a requirement that the citizen parent obtain proof within thirty days after the child's birth would not
eliminate the discriminatory effect because the unwed father is usually not
present during childbirth. '93 Again, the plurality's reasoning is based on
stereotypes and generalizations regarding the roles of unwed fathers.
The gender-based stereotypes underlying section 1409 are also untrue." The Act assumes that fathers are less likely than mothers to develop meaningful relationships with their children."' However, not all
186. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1461 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979); see also Linda R. Crane, Family
Values and the Supreme Court, 25 CONN. L. REv. 427, 461-62 (1993) (discussing the Court's refusal to accept such a generalization in Caban).
188. See William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of
Justice Stevens, 1989 DUKE LJ. 1087, 1115-16; Note, Justice Stevens' Equal ProtectionJurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1146, 1163 (1987).
189. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at3437.
190. See ZiNGO & EARLY, supra note 10, at 58 (discussing the Court's decision in Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)); Crane, supra note 187, at 443 (criticizing Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Caban v. Mohammed, in which he applied reasoning similar to his decision in
Miller).
191. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 53, § 18.14.
192. Miller, 18 S. CL at 1454 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 1438.
194. See Amicus Brief at 7, Miller v. Albright, 118 S. CL 1428 (1998) (No. 96-1060) (brief in
support of petitioner).
195. Miller, 138 S. C. at 1441. Interestingly, the plurality admitted this assumption. See id. at
1492.
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illegitimate child/father relationships lack the strength the government
attempts to instill and "there are undoubtedly many illegitimate
child/mother relationships that lack the closeness the Act attempts to
promote."'" In addition, denial of parental rights to unwed fathers solely
on the basis of sex is unsupported by social science research indicating
that fathers' child rearing abilities do not differ significantly from mothers' abilities." Because the plurality insufficiently justified that the classifications and the stereotypes underlying the Act are no longer true, the
plurality should not have upheld section 1409 even under the rational
basis level of review.
C. Miller Ignores Precedent Indicating That Section 1409 Is Unconstitutional
The plurality also improperly ignored several cases and other important indications that section 1409 violates the Fifth Amendment. First,
in the early 1980s, the Attorney General listed the Act under the category
of "uncorrected sex biases in federal statutes" in its Report to the President on Women's Equality'" and warned that it might violate the Equal
Protection Clause.'" Interestingly, when Congress amended the Act in
1986,.- although it allowed illegitimate children to acquire rights of citizenship through an American father, Congress did not give those children the same rights as children with American mothers. ' Instead, in an
effort to ease the determination of citizenship and paternity, Congress
amended the Act to require the father to take affirmative actions during
an illegitimate child's minority.' Therefore, section 1409 continued to
classify based on the parent's gender, and it now remains the only United
States law conferring nationality to children that distinguishes American
citizen parents on the basis of their gender.' In 1998, the Supreme
Court, once again, failed to eliminate the discrimination.'

196. Richard F. Hahn, Note, ConstitutionalLimits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 957,988 (1982).
197. See Kara L. Boucher & Ruthann M. Macolini, The Parental Rights of Unwed Fathers:A
Developmental Perspective,20 N.C. CENT. LJ. 45,61 (1992).
198. 128 CONG. REC. H5369,5376 (daily ed. Aug. 5,1982) (statement of the Attorey General).
199. Id.; see Leo Gross & Luke T. Lee, The Family in InternationalLaw: Some Emerging
Problems, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 202,203 n.1 (1983) (reviewing THE FAMILY ININTERNATIONAL LAW:
SOME EMERGING PROBLEMS (THIRD SOKOL COU.OQUIUM) (Richard B. Lillich, ed., 198 1)).
200. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, 100 Stat.

3655 (codified as amended is scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
201.

Id. § 13, 100 Stat. at 3657 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1994)); see GORDON ET AL., supra

note 65, § 93.04(2Xc).
202. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, § 13, 100 Stat. at 3657 (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1409). The 1986 amendment required a father, among other things, to agree "in writing to
provide financial support for the child." Id. § 13(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
203. Laurel Fletcher et al., Human Rights Violations Against Women, 15 wHrrnER L. REV.
319,344(1994).
204. Cf. Millerv. Albright, 118S. Ct. 1428 (1998).
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The plurality also overlooked several cases that have held that a statute "may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by
denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally. "
Moreover, the Court failed to consider cases that held statutes unconstitutional that required only fathers to take actions to benefit their illegitimate children.'
Rather, Justice Stevens believed that Lehr v.
Robertson,' an adoption case, directly supported his decision in Miller.'
Miller and Lehr each required an unwed father, and not an unwed
mother, to take affirmative steps to receive rights associated with their
children." In Lehr, however, the strong governmental interest in the
adoption of illegitimate children provided sufficient justification for the
classification 2 --this government interest was not present in Miller.!"
Additionally, in Lehr, the father was asserting his rights, not the rights of
his child,," and courts have been more reluctant to strike down statutes
that deny rights to the father rather than those which deny rights to the
child."'
The Court was not persuaded by Wauchope v. United States Department of State,"" which held that a statute conferring U.S. citizenship on
foreign-born children of citizen fathers, not mothers, violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 5 The U.S. government chose not to appeal Wauchope
because it "is consistent with modem developments in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence concerning statutory distinctions based on
gender."' Because Wauchope parallels the structural setting of Miller

205. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535,538 (1973); see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,766
(1977) (concluding that the statute at issue unconstitutionally discriminated against illegitimate
children).

206.
207.

See supra Part LA.2.
463 U.S. 248 (1983).

208. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1440. Justice Stevens also wrote the majority opinion in Lehr v.
Robertson. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 249-68.
209. Miller, I 1SS.Ct. at 1440; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266-68.
210. Lehr,463 U.S. at 266; see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 395 (1979) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (indicating that states encourage adoption and that courts use the strong state interest

as a justification for the classification).
211. Miller, 118S.Ct.at 1432.
212. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 257.
213. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (dismissing an unwed father's
claim that an adoption law violated the Equal Protection Clause); see also Crane, supra note 187, at

427 (describing cases inwhich fathers sought to assert their rights and stating that they "face a
greater than average risk of denial").
214. 985 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1993).
215. Wauchope, 985 F.2d at 1418.
216. Drew S.Days, I1,The Solicitor General and the American Legal Ideal, Alfred P. Murrah
Lecture at the Southern Methodist University School of Law (Feb. 2, 1995), in 49 SMU L. REV. 73,
81 (1995) (quoting Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Michael Davidson, Senate Legal
Counsel 2-3 (Oct. 15, 1993)); see also Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1475 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (Vald, J.,
concurring).
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(except that Wauchope involved discrimination against females) the
Court should have at least considered the case' 7
In LeBrun v. Thronburgh,1 ' a federal district court specifically determined that the distinction made in section 1409 between legitimate
and illegitimate children was "unreasonable and arbitrary" and failed to
meet even the minimum rationality standard? 9 It appears that the opinion
of the district court in LeBrun was so well reasoned that the government
did not attempt an appeal to the circuit court.' Not only did LeBrun involve the constitutionality of the same provision as was at issue in
Miller," but the facts were also remarkably similar, as each involved
daughters of American soldiers who did not discover their fathers before
reaching the age of majority. Despite the fact that Ms. Penero Miller
cited and explained that LeBrun presented an issue directly on point with
Miller the plurality failed to mention the case in its discussion.
D. Miller Ignored Section 1409's UnconstitutionalDiscriminationof
Illegitimate Children
In addition to classifying on the basis of gender, section 1409 also
distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate children.' While children born abroad and out of wedlock to an American father must prove
paternity and obtain the support of their father during the age of minority, children born to married parents do not face these hurdles in order
to receive citizenship.' Consequently, if section 1409 did not distinguish
based on illegitimacy, the distinction between mothers and fathers of
illegitimate children would not be present. By failing to consider the
INA's discriminatory treatment of illegitimate children,' the Supreme
Court incorrectly upheld the Act.

217. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200 (1976) (applying equal protection principles in a
case involving discrimination against males). Although Wauchope is persuasive, the Supreme Court
is not bound by Ninth Circuit rulings. Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior
CourtPrecedents?,46 STAN. L. REv. 817,823-24 (1994).
218. 777F. Supp. 1204(D.NJ. 1991).
219. Lebrun, 777 F. Supp. at 1211.
220. See Petitioners' Brief at 12, Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998) (No. 96-1060); see
also Wauchope v. United States Dep't of State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1418 (9th Cit. 1993) (holding that a
statute conferring U.S. citizenship on foreign-born children of citizen fathers, not mothers, violated

the Equal Protection Clause).
221. LeBrun, 777 F. Supp. at 1207.
222. Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1432-33 (1998); LeBrun, 777 F. Supp. at 1205. 'The
plaintiff in LeBrun was bom in France to unmarried parents--an American World War I soldier
father and a French mother. Id.
223. Petitioners' Brief at 11-14, Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998) (No. 96-1060).
224. See LeBrun, 777 F. Supp. at 1211.
225. INA § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1994).
226. Id. § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401.
227. The Court narrowed the issue by limiting certiorari to the question, "Is the distinction in 8
U.S.C. § 1409 between 'illegitimate' children of U.S. citizen mothers and 'illegitimate' children of
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The outcome of an equal protection case in the foregoing context
often depends on whether the Court chooses to analyze the interests of
the illegitimate child or the interests of the parents.' In LeBrun, the court
found that section 1409 discriminated on the basis of both sex and illegitimacy.' By contrast, in Miller, the plurality narrowed the issue to
whether section 1409 unconstitutionally distinguished between mothers
and fathers'm and failed to consider whether the statute also discriminated
on the basis of illegitimacy."' The plurality neglected to acknowledge
that the Supreme Court has recognized for several decades that classifications treating illegitimate children more harshly than legitimate children violate equal protection.2 The plurality also failed to recognize that
other countries have completely eliminated the unnecessary distinction
between illegitimate and legitimate children. 3 Moreover, although the
Act seeks to reunite families, it reflects only the traditional view of the
family,' a view which is impracticable in today's society as illegitimacy
rates continue to increase and single parenthood is not uncommon.'
Although the Supreme Court has consistently held that children
should not be punished for the conduct of their parents or as a method of
deterring the parents' conduct, ' the decision in Miller to uphold section
U.S. fathers a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Miller v. Albright, 117 S. CL 1689, 1689 (1997).
228. See Howlett, supranote 16, at 14.
229. LeBrun, 777 F. Supp. at 1213; see also Gross & Lee, supra note 199, at 203 n.I (citing
128 CONG. REc. 15369,5376 (daily cd. Aug. 5, 1982) (statement of Attorney General)) (stating that
section 1409 may violate the Equal Protection Clause because it discriminates on the basis of sex
and against illegitimate children).
230. Millerv. Albright, 118S.CL 1428,1434(1998).
231. See LeBrun, 777 F. Supp. at 1213 (holding that section 1409 unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of both sex and illegitimacy); see also HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW 927-28
(3d ed. 1990) (stating that distinguishing between mothers and fathers has unnecessarily introduced
the subject of sex discrimination into the issue of illegitimacy).
232. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-89 (1979) (finding a requirement that
only the permission of an unwed mother, not an unwed father, to adopt a child violated the Equal
Protection Clause); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding for the first time that classification based on illegitimacy violates equal protection); see alsosupra Part LA.2.
233. See Bernard Friedland & Valerie Epps, The Changing Family and the U.S. Immigration
Laws: The Impact of Medical Reproductive Technology on the Immigration and Nationality Act's
Definition of the Family, I I GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 429, 442 (1997).
234. Id. at 429-30.
235. LeBrun, 777 F. Supp. at 1213; see also O'Brien, supra note 2, at 110 (recognizing the
increasing number of illegitimate children born each year).
236. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977) (stating that to punish children for the
conduct of their parents "does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice"); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (noting that although legislatures may wish to
discourage premarital sexual relations, "visiting.. . condemnation [for such relations] on the head of
an infant is illogical and unjust'). See generally Note, The Birthright Citizenship Amendment: A
Threat to Equality, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1026, 1031-32 (1994) (giving an overview of Supreme
Court decisions involving statutes that classify according to illegitimacy). To deny or deprive a child
of rights strictly on the basis of a parent's marital status is contrary to the child's best interests.
Nicole E. Miller, Note, The Best Interests of All Children:An Examination of GrandparentVisitation Rights RegardingChildren Born Out of Wedlock, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 179, 185 (1998).
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1409 will likely have a punitive effect on illegitimate children.' According to the INA, an illegitimate child cannot receive citizenship unless her American father agrees to take the steps required by section
1409.' Consequently, illegitimate children are disadvantaged because
few can locate or gain the support of their fathers. ' For example, only
fifteen percent of Filipino-Amerasian children with fathers who were
American service personnel have been able to receive citizenship based
on section 1409." In Miller, Justice Stevens reiterated the position that a
father may not receive equal protection rights associated with his child if
he fails to participate in raising the child." As a result, the Court deprived Ms. Penero Miller of her U.S. citizenship because her father failed
to take the appropriate steps to legitimate her while she was a minor.2'
IV. CONCLUSION
The plurality decision in Miller held that section 1409 does not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.' Section
1409 of the INA imposes a burden on the children of unwed citizen fathers, but not children of unwed citizen mothers, and is therefore the type
of gender discrimination banned by the Supreme Court in previous decisions. ' As Part II details, the plurality opinion applied an incorrect level
of scrutiny and failed to adequately justify the classification made by
section 1409. Moreover, the Court ignored important precedent and the
discriminatory effects of section 1409 on illegitimate children.
In several immigration cases, the Supreme Court has failed to use its
authority to strike down a statute that violates the Equal Protection
Clause because it believes that Congress should make these changes.'
The Court's refusal to adequately review the constitutionality of federal
statutes makes immigration law a "constitutional oddity."'" Similarly, in
Miller, the plurality acknowledged that the additional requirements imposed on unwed citizen fathers are unnecessary in light of reliable genetic testing, but believed that it was Congress's decision whether to
change the Act." The Court appears to use the deference given to Con-

237. Miller, supra note 236, at 193.
238. SeeLeirun,777F.Supp.at 1206, 1212.
239. See Joseph M. Ahem, Comment, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: United States Immigration
Law and PolicyAs Applied to Filipino-Amerasians,I PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 105, 112 (1992).

240.

Id.

241. Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1437 (1998); accord Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,
267 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,392 (1979).
242. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1432-33, 1437-42.
243. Id. at 1440.
244. Lebunv. Thomburgh,777F.Supp. 1204, 1213 (D.NJ. 1991).
245. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 n.9 (1977) (stating that the issue "should be

addressed to the Congress rather than the courts").
246. Scaperlanda, supranote 179, at 713-14.
247. Miller, 118S. Ct. at 1438-39.
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gress as an excuse for not taking appropriate action.' Because Congress
has failed to eliminate the discriminatory classifications in section 1409,
the Court should have taken responsibility for ensuring that the statute
conformed to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause in Miller.
One would hope, as critics' reactions to Miller have initially indicated,
that the decision will only "stand for the moment.'"
Nikki Ahrenholz

248. See Scaperlanda,supra note 179, at 716.
249. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1297, 1400 n.318 (1998).

